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OPINION OF THE COURT  
________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 
This is an appeal from the District Court’s entry of 
judgment on the pleadings against appellant-plaintiff Andrew 
Wolfington on his claim under the Truth in Lending Act1 (“the 
Act”).  Wolfington’s claim under the Act stems from 
reconstructive knee surgery he received from defendant-
appellee Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates II PC, also 
known as the Rothman Institute (“Rothman”).  Wolfington 
alleged that Rothman failed to provide disclosures required by 
the Act when it permitted him to pay his deductible in monthly 
installments following surgery.  The District Court entered 
                                              
1 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 
3 
 
judgment on Wolfington’s claim because it determined he had 
failed to allege that credit had been extended to him in a 
“written agreement,” as required by the Act’s implementing 
regulation, Regulation Z.2  After entering judgment, the 
District Court also sua sponte imposed sanctions on 
Wolfington’s counsel.  Because we agree that Wolfington 
failed to adequately allege the existence of a written 
agreement, but conclude that counsel’s investigation and 
conduct were not unreasonable, we affirm in part and reverse 
in part. 
 
I. Background  
 
Because the District Court granted judgment on the 
pleadings,3 we accept the well-pled allegations in Wolfington’s 
Complaint as true.  Those allegations may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
A. Wolfington’s Surgery 
 
Wolfington agreed on January 12, 2016 to have surgery 
provided by Rothman, scheduled for January 21, 2016.  As part 
of the January 12 agreement, Wolfington signed a document 
titled “Financial Policy.”4  The Policy provided that 
Wolfington agreed to pay any outstanding deductible not 
                                              
2 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. 
3 See JA 16-18, JA 18 n.6.  Because the District Court also 
purported to grant summary judgment in the alternative, we 
note facts outside the pleadings as appropriate. 
4 JA 87; Financial Policy, Mot. J. Pleadings Ex. A, Wolfington 
v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs., II, P.C., No. 16-cv-
4935 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2016), ECF No. 10-4 at 5. 
4 
 
covered by his insurance before his surgery took place.  The 
day before Wolfington’s surgery, however, Wolfington’s 
father informed Rothman that Wolfington was unable to pay 
his deductible, then around $2,000.  Rothman orally agreed to 
accept a $200 “initial payment” by Wolfington and to permit 
him to pay the remaining deductible in monthly installments of 
$100 (the “January 20 Agreement”).5  Wolfington received two 
emails on January 20, one confirming the $200 payment and 
the other confirming the establishment of the payment plan and 
listing the credit card to which payments would be charged.  
The Complaint quotes both emails in full.  Wolfington had 
surgery as scheduled, but subsequently failed to make any 
further payments on his outstanding deductible.  
 
B. Proceedings in the District Court 
 
Wolfington filed a putative class action in the District 
Court, alleging that Rothman had extended him credit in the 
January 20 Agreement, subject to the Truth in Lending Act, but 
failed to provide disclosures required by the Act.  The 
Complaint set forth two claims, including one for violation of 
the Act.  His second claim, for violation of the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act, was later withdrawn.  Rothman filed an 
Answer with counterclaims for breach of contract and a Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings, which included a copy of the 
Financial Policy, along with other documents.   
 
Prior to issuing its decision on Rothman’s Motion, the 
District Court conducted a six-minute telephone conference 
with the parties on the record on December 14, 2016.6  During 
                                              
5 JA 87. 
6 Cf. JA 100, JA 104. 
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that telephone conference, the District Court addressed two 
factual issues with the parties.  First, the District Court 
confirmed that Wolfington had made no payments pursuant to 
the January 20 Agreement.  Second, the District Court asked if 
there was “anything in writing confirming this arrangement?”7  
Wolfington’s counsel replied, “[T]he only information that we 
have is the confirmation receipts with respect to an online bill 
payment plan . . . that indicated the $100 a month payments.”8  
Defense counsel then stated, “That’s correct . . . . There’s no 
signed agreement by the plaintiff to make the payments.”9   
 
Eight days after the telephone conference, the District 
Court granted Rothman’s Motion.  In granting the Motion, the 
District Court first determined that it could properly rely on the 
Financial Policy, reasoning that the allegations in the 
Complaint referenced and relied on it.  The District Court also 
relied on counsel’s statement at oral argument, stating, 
“[U]nder the concession of Plaintiff’s counsel . . . there is no 
longer any dispute as to any material fact, establishing that 
there was no finance charge and no ‘written agreement’ 
between the parties.”10  Based on that evidence, the District 
Court concluded that Wolfington failed to allege the existence 
of a written agreement for the extension of credit.  
 
In its memorandum, the District Court framed its 
decision as a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).  The 
District Court analyzed Wolfington’s claims only under the 
standard for Rule 12(c) and provided no substantive analysis 
                                              
7 JA 101. 
8 JA 101-02. 
9 JA 102. 
10 JA 28. 
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of the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56.  Pursuant 
to Rule 12(c), the District Court declined to consider “certain 
documents” Rothman attached to its Motion in order to avoid 
“converting the instant Motion into one for summary 
judgment.”11  After determining it would grant judgment on the 
pleadings, however, the District Court stated, “Alternatively, 
Defendant’s motion will be converted into one for summary 
judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(d), which will also be 
granted.”12  Wolfington moved for reconsideration under Rule 
59(e), which the District Court denied. 
 
In granting Rothman’s Motion, the District Court also 
sua sponte initiated sanctions proceedings under Rule 11 
against Wolfington’s counsel.  Prior to imposing sanctions, the 
District Court accepted declarations from Wolfington’s 
counsel, conducted a hearing, and received supplemental 
briefing.  The District Court concluded that sanctions in the 
form of attorneys’ fees were appropriate, reasoning that 
counsel could have reasonably discovered both the lack of a 
written agreement and Wolfington’s failure to make any 
payments on the deductible before filing the Complaint.  
Ultimately, the District Court imposed sanctions under Rule 11 
of $38,447.91.  The sanctions were imposed solely for 
                                              
11 JA 18. 
12 JA 28.  The District Court’s later descriptions of its 
December 2016 entry of judgment on the pleadings further 
muddled the standard it chose to apply.  In its September 2017 
memorandum imposing sanctions under Rule 11, the District 
Court described Rothman’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings both as “pursuant to Rule 12(c) because it attached 
factual materials” and “as a Rule 56 motion [upon which] 
summary judgment was entered for” Rothman.  JA 41, 43.  
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Wolfington’s claim under the Truth in Lending Act, and not 
for the withdrawn claim under the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act, although the District Court stated it retained the authority 
to impose sanctions on the withdrawn claim. 
 
II. Discussion13  
On appeal, Wolfington challenges the District Court’s 
entry of judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and 
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.  For the reasons below, 
we conclude that Wolfington has failed to adequately allege a 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, but that his counsel’s 
investigation and conduct were not unreasonable.  We 
therefore affirm the entry of judgment on the pleadings and 
reverse the imposition of sanctions. 
 
A.   Truth in Lending Act  
First, Wolfington challenges the District Court’s entry 
of judgment on the pleadings on his claim under the Truth in 
Lending Act.  In particular, Wolfington contends that (1) the 
District Court erred under Rule 12(c) by considering material 
outside the pleadings—namely, counsel’s purported 
concession that there was no written agreement—and, (2) he 
has adequately alleged (a) the extension of credit, (b) the 
                                              
13 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
Wolfington also alleges that this Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  That provision, however, is 
applicable only to appeals from the final judgments of 
bankruptcy courts.  See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 
300, 313 (1995). 
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consummation of a credit transaction, and (c) a written 
agreement.  Although we conclude the District Court erred in 
considering material outside the pleadings, we affirm the entry 
of judgment on the pleadings because Wolfington has failed to 
allege the existence of a written agreement, as required by 
Regulation Z. 
 
1. Applicable Law 
(a) Judgment on the Pleadings 
 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 
12(c) “is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”14  Consequently, the court must “view 
the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party,” and may not grant the motion “unless the movant 
clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be 
resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”15  Thus, in deciding a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, a court may only consider “the complaint, exhibits 
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims 
are based upon these documents.”16   
 
If the court considers matters outside pleadings other 
than documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the 
                                              
14 Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
15 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 
n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
16 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
9 
 
complaint,”17 the “motion must be treated as one for summary 
judgment under Rule 56.”18  Conversion of a motion under 
Rule 12 to one for summary judgment requires that “the 
procedures of Rule 56 govern.”19  Those procedures include 
providing the parties at least ten days’ notice and the 
opportunity to submit evidence of record to support or oppose 
summary judgment.20  Review on appeal is de novo.21  
 
   (b) Truth in Lending Act  
Wolfington brings his sole remaining claim under the 
Truth in Lending Act22 and its implementing regulation 
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, Regulation Z.23  
                                              
17 Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation mark and emphasis omitted) (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997)). 
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  
19 Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989). 
20 Id. 
21 Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 
23 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq.  Primary authority for enforcement 
of the Act was transferred from the Federal Reserve Board to 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010.  Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1100A(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2107 (codified in 
part at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(b)).  The Bureau’s regulations are 
codified in Part 1026 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations and are materially identical to those promulgated 
by the Board for purposes of this appeal.  Unless noted 
10 
 
The Act and Regulation Z require a “creditor” extending credit 
to make certain disclosures24 before the “consummation” of the 
credit transaction.25   
 
To be subject to the Act’s disclosure requirements, a 
lender must qualify as a “creditor” both in general and in the 
particular challenged transaction.26  Under Regulation Z, a 
creditor is a person “who regularly extends consumer credit 
that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written 
agreement in more than 4 installments (not including a down 
payment)” and to whom the debt in dispute “is initially 
payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by 
agreement when there is no note or contract.”27  “Credit” is “the 
right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its 
payment.”28 
 
                                              
otherwise, we will refer to both agencies collectively as “the 
Board.” 
24 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a). 
25 46 Fed. Reg. 50,288, 50,323 (Oct. 9, 1981), as reprinted in 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I, cmt. 17(b) (2012), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2012-title12-
vol3/pdf/CFR-2012-title12-vol3-part226-appI-id377.pdf; cf. 
Bartholomew v. Northampton Nat’l Bank, 584 F.2d 1288, 1296 
(3d Cir. 1978) (“The Truth-In-Lending Act requires that 
creditors make full disclosure prior to the extension of 
credit.”). 
26 Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 411 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
27 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i).  The parties agree that Rothman 
did not extend credit subject to a finance charge. 
28 Id. § 226.2(a)(14). 
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Under Regulation Z, in the Federal Reserve Board 
staff’s view, a written credit agreement requires more than an 
“informal workout arrangement” of debt or “a unilateral 
written communication by either the creditor or the 
customer.”29  Instead, a written agreement requires “some new 
evidence of indebtedness executed by the customer, such as a 
new note, contract or other form of written agreement.”30  
However, the requirement of a written agreement is not 
satisfied by a “letter that merely confirms an oral agreement.”31  
 
Once an entity qualifies as a creditor, it must make the 
required disclosures before the “consummation” of the credit 
transaction.32  A credit transaction is consummated when the 
“consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit 
transaction.”33   
It is under this law that we consider Wolfington’s 
appeal. 
2. The District Court Erred in Entering 
Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the 
Alternative, Summary Judgment 
Wolfington first argues that the District Court 
improperly relied on counsel’s purported admission during the 
December 14, 2016 telephone conference that there was no 
                                              
29 Part 226—Truth in Lending Official Staff Interpretations, 42 
Fed. Reg. 40,424, 40,425 (Aug. 10, 1977). 
30 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425. 
31 46 Fed. Reg. at 50,293, as reprinted in 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
supp. I, cmt. 2(a)(17). 
32 46 Fed. Reg. at 50,323.  Rothman does not dispute that it did 
not make the required disclosures. 
33 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13). 
12 
 
written agreement between the parties.  Wolfington is correct, 
for three reasons.   
 
 First and foremost, the admission was a “matter[] 
outside the pleadings”34 and improperly considered in deciding 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Motions for judgment 
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are considered under the 
same standard as motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),35 and 
it is well established that a motion to dismiss may be decided 
based only on the “complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based 
upon these documents.”36  Although the District Court stated 
that it accepted the facts of Wolfington’s Complaint as true and 
that it did not consider matters outside the pleadings,37 it 
nonetheless expressly relied on counsel’s purported admission 
during oral argument, stating, “[U]nder the concession of 
Plaintiff’s counsel . . . there is no longer any dispute as to any 
material fact.”38  Because the District Court relied on matters 
outside the pleadings, it erred in entering judgment on the 
pleadings. 
 
We have previously determined that admissions by 
counsel at oral argument may not support dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6).  In Schmidt v. Skolas, we reversed the dismissal of a 
suit for breach of fiduciary duty based on an admission by 
                                              
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 
35 Revell, 598 F.3d at 134. 
36 Mayer, 605 F.3d at 230. 
37 JA 13, JA 18 n.6. 
38 JA 28. 
13 
 
counsel.39  In that case, counsel admitted at oral argument that 
the relevant conduct occurred outside the applicable statute of 
limitations.40  The dissent argued that the plaintiff should have 
been bound by counsel’s admission.41  The majority, however, 
reversed the dismissal, reasoning that where “the pleading does 
not reveal when the limitations period began to run . . . the 
statute of limitations cannot justify Rule 12 dismissal,” despite 
counsel’s admission.42  Similarly, in Bruni v. City of 
Pittsburgh, we concluded that the District Court erred in 
granting a motion to dismiss based “upon testimony given at 
the [previous preliminary injunction] hearing and the 
supplemental declarations filed by” the parties.43  Thus, in this 
case, the District Court improperly considered counsel’s 
purported admission.  
 
                                              
39 Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249-50; id. at 254 (Rendell, J., 
dissenting). 
40 Id. at 254 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 255 & n.3. 
42 Id. at 251 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 
2011)); accord Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“In effect, the trial court adopted portions of the 
defendants’ claims as fact without acknowledging any 
contradiction with the complaint. . . . In so doing, the court 
failed to apply the standards of Rule 12(b)(6).  Dismissal under 
these circumstances was error.”) 
43 824 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2016). 
14 
 
 Second, an admission must be “unequivocal” to be 
binding.44  Ordinarily, an “admission of counsel during the 
course of trial is binding on his client.”45  “However, to be 
binding . . . admissions must be unequivocal.”46  Counsel’s 
purported admission was not.  As noted above, the District 
Court asked, “[I]s there anything in writing confirming this 
arrangement?”47  Wolfington’s counsel responded that “the 
only information that we have is the confirmation receipts with 
respect to an online bill payment plan . . . that indicated the 
$100 a month payments.”48  Counsel for Rothman then stated, 
“That’s correct . . . . There’s no signed agreement by the 
plaintiff to make the payments.”49  Notably, in imposing 
sanctions later, the District Court placed emphasis on the 
statement by Rothman’s counsel, not Wolfington’s.50  The 
statement by Wolfington’s counsel did not amount to an 
“unequivocal” admission that there was no written agreement, 
and the District Court’s reliance on the statement as a binding 
admission was improper. 
 
                                              
44 Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 
1972) 1291 (citing Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 
(1880)). 
45 Id. (citing Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 
481 (3d Cir. 1965)); accord Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 
455 F.3d 195, 211 n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that a client may 
be bound by counsel’s admissions in “pleadings or briefs”). 
46 Glick, 458 F.2d at 1291 (citing Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 
U.S. 261 (1880)). 
47 JA 101. 
48 JA 101-02. 
49 JA 102. 
50 JA 42. 
15 
 
 Third and finally, to the extent that the District Court 
converted Rothman’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
into one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d),51 it failed to 
provide Wolfington with the required notice.  In particular, the 
District Court was required to allow “the parties [to] have at 
least ten days[’] notice” before converting the Motion under 
Rule 12(d).52  “Although notice need not be express, we have 
recommended that district courts provide express notice 
because it ‘is easy to give and removes ambiguities.’”53   
 
Here, Wolfington had insufficient notice of the 
conversion to summary judgment.  The District Court entered 
judgment only eight days after counsel’s purported admission 
during the December 14, 2016 telephone conference, and it 
gave no indication during that conference that it was 
considering converting the Motion to one for summary 
judgment.  Further, Rothman’s motion was captioned only as 
a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative 
to Bifurcate Discovery,”54 and it was only in Rothman’s Reply 
Brief in Support of Its Motion Under Federal Rule 12(c) that 
the possibility of conversion was raised.55  Nowhere in the 
record before us did the District Court acknowledge that 
                                              
51 JA 28 (“Alternatively, Defendant’s motion will be converted 
into one for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(d) . . . .”). 
52 Rose, 871 F.2d at 340. 
53 Bruni, 824 F.3d at 360 n.9 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. 
Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288 n.11 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
54 JA 74. 
55 Reply Br. at 2, Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic 




possibility.  That was insufficient notice of conversion under 
Rule 12(d). 
 
3. Because Wolfington Failed to Sufficiently 
Plead the Existence of a Written 
Agreement, the District Court’s Error 
Was Harmless  
Despite the erroneous conversion of the Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings into one for summary judgment, we 
conclude that that error was harmless.  A district court’s 
“failure to give adequate notice [under Rule 12(d)] does not . . . 
require automatic reversal.”56  Instead, the error may be 
excused if the complaint likewise failed to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6), rendering the district court’s failure “harmless 
error.”57   
 
Rothman raises three arguments that Wolfington failed 
to state a claim under the Truth in Lending Act:  (a) there was 
no extension of “credit” by Rothman to Wolfington; (b) any 
extension of credit was not “consummated” under the Act; and, 
(c) any credit agreement was not in writing.  We conclude that, 
although Wolfington has sufficiently pled the extension of 
credit and consummation of the credit transaction, he failed to 
plead the existence of a written agreement. 
 
  (a) Extension of credit 
 
The parties first dispute whether Wolfington’s 
arrangements with Rothman constituted an extension of 
                                              
56 Rose, 871 F.2d at 342. 
57 Id.; accord Bruni, 824 F.3d at 361-62. 
17 
 
“credit.”  As noted above, under Regulation Z, “credit” is “the 
right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its 
payment.”58  The parties’ dispute centers on whether 
Wolfington’s arrangements were merely an informal workout 
agreement of “preexisting” debt, a requirement they believe is 
established by the Seventh Circuit’s decision Bright v. Ball 
Memorial Hospital.59  We ultimately conclude that the 
presence of “preexisting” debt is irrelevant under the Act and 
that the arrangements between Wolfington and Rothman 
constituted an extension of credit. 
 
In Bright, which pre-dated the most relevant 
amendments to Regulation Z, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that payment arrangements between a hospital and two former 
patients were not subject to the Act.  The Bright court affirmed 
the dismissal of the plaintiff-debtors’ Truth in Lending claims 
on two grounds.  First—and discussed more fully below—it 
concluded that some of the credit transactions were not 
“consummated” because there was no evidence that the debtors 
accepted the payment terms offered by the hospital.60  
Second—and bearing on this issue—the Bright court 
concluded that two of the debtors’ transactions did not 
constitute an extension of credit. 61  Instead, it determined the 
transactions were “an informal workout arrangement,”62 
                                              
58 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14). 
59 616 F.2d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1980). 
60 Id. at 333-34.  We address Rothman’s contention that 
Wolfington’s credit transaction was not “consummated” 
below. 
61 Id. at 334. 
62 Id. (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425). 
18 
 
pursuant to a 1977 Federal Reserve Board interpretation of an 
older version of Regulation Z.   
 
That interpretation provided that the Act’s requirements 
are applicable only to “formal written workout 
arrangement[s],” which “involve some new evidence of 
indebtedness executed by the customer, such as a new note, 
contract or other form of written agreement.”63  In contrast, “an 
informal workout arrangement” does not trigger the Act’s 
requirements.64  Because the debtors’ agreements with the 
hospital “were reached without a new written evidence of 
[their] indebtedness,” the Bright court concluded they were 
merely an informal workout arrangement and not an extension 
of credit.65   
 
Pursuant to Bright, Rothman and Wolfington dispute at 
length whether the January 12 Financial Policy created a 
“preexisting debt” and whether the subsequent January 20 
Agreement was merely an “informal workout arrangement” of 
that debt.66   
 
We believe that dispute is misplaced because whether 
debt is “preexisting” is irrelevant under both Bright and the 
Act.  The critical issue in Bright was not whether the debt was 
                                              
63 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(p) (1977) 
(defining “consumer credit”)). 
64 Id. 
65 616 F.2d at 335. 
66 Appellee Br. at 9 (“The District Court correctly concluded 
that under the facts as pled Rothman did not extend credit but 
instead attempted to collect a pre-existing debt.”); id. at 14-15, 
17-20, 24; Reply at 14-17.   
19 
 
“preexisting” but the level of formality required to establish an 
extension of credit.67  In defining that level of formality, the 
Bright court relied on the Federal Reserve Board’s 1977 staff 
interpretation, which contrasted the extension of credit in a 
formal “written” agreement with an “informal workout 
arrangement.”68  There was no extension of credit in that case, 
not because the debt was preexisting, but because there were 
no formal written “evidence” of the credit transaction.69  Thus, 
in Bright, the presence of “preexisting” debt was entirely 
irrelevant to a claim under the Act. 
 
Likewise, the presence of “preexisting” debt is 
irrelevant under the plain text of the Act and Regulation Z, 
amended since Bright, as well.  As noted above, the Act defines 
credit as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer 
payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.”70  That 
“definition contemplates that one who confers a right to pay a 
pre-existing debt in more than four installments will be a 
‘creditor.’”71  Limited to Wolfington’s pleadings, we conclude 
he has sufficiently pled that he was conferred such a right.  He 
alleges that Rothman permitted him to pay off the remaining 
deductible stemming from his surgery at the rate of $100 per 
month.  Because the Act reaches extensions of credit to defer 
payment of both preexisting and newly incurred debts, it is 
irrelevant whether the January 12 Financial Policy created a 
                                              
67 616 F.2d at 334. 
68 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425.   
69 616 F.2d at 334 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f); accord 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14) 
(“Credit means the right to defer payment of debt or to incur 
debt and defer its payment.”). 
71 Pollice, 225 F.3d at 413. 
20 
 
debt or not.  Thus, we conclude that Wolfington has 
sufficiently pled an extension of “credit.” 
 
In reaching that conclusion, we part ways with the 
Bright court in analyzing whether a written agreement is 
required for an extension of “credit.”  At the time of the Bright 
decision, a written agreement was required only by the Federal 
Reserve Board’s 1977 staff interpretation.72  However, that 
requirement was expressly added to Regulation Z in 1981, 
when the Federal Reserve Board opted to include it under the 
definition of “creditor.”73  Consequently, we conclude that the 
contrast between a formal “written” agreement and an 
“informal workout” of preexisting debt is better analyzed, 
infra, under Rothman’s argument that Wolfington failed to 
plead a written agreement under the definition of “creditor.” 
 
  (b) Consummation  
 
Second, Rothman and Wolfington dispute whether the 
extension of credit was “consummated” under the Act.  As 
noted above, a creditor must make the Act’s required 
disclosures before “consummation” of the credit transaction; a 
credit transaction is “consummated” only at “the time that a 
consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit 
                                              
72 Compare 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425, with 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) 
(1981). 
73 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848, 20,851 (Apr. 7, 1981) (“The definition 
has also been revised to require, if there is no finance charge, 
that there be a written agreement to pay in more than four 
installments, in order for a person offering credit to be 
considered a creditor. This is narrower than in the current 
regulation, which covers both oral and written agreements.”). 
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transaction.”74  Under an older version of that requirement,75 
the Bright court concluded that the credit transactions in that 
case were not consummated.76  It reached that conclusion 
because the debtors’ sporadic payments were “clearly not 
responsive to either of th[e] work-out agreements” offered by 
the hospital.77  Because the patients in Bright never responded 
to the hospital’s offered payment plans, they never manifested 
assent to the proposed agreements.78  Consequently, the court 
concluded that there was no contractual relationship between 
the parties and the credit transaction was never 
consummated.79   
 
We conclude that, unlike the transactions in Bright, the 
January 20 Agreement was consummated.  The court in Bright 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a binding 
contractual agreement to constitute “consummation” of the 
credit transaction.  Based solely on the pleadings, however, we 
conclude that Wolfington sufficiently pled the formation of a 
contractual agreement:  offer, acceptance, and “mutual assent 
to essential terms.”80  He pled that he reached a payment 
agreement with Rothman that involved a down payment and 
monthly installments “until the balance of the deductible was 
fully satisfied.”81   
                                              
74 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13). 
75 Id. § 226.2(kk) (1980). 
76 616 F.2d at 333. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 333-34. 
79 Id.  
80 Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int’l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1284 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 




In response, Rothman raises three arguments, none of 
which is availing.  First, it argues that Wolfington did not enter 
into a contractual agreement because he never “signed any 
written document agreeing to make payments.”82  Rothman 
misconstrues the requirements for formation of a “legally 
binding contract.”83  It is black-letter law that, as a general 
matter, no signed document is required to create a contractual 
obligation.  Instead, the exchange of promises to perform is 
sufficient to form a contract.84  Wolfington has pled such an 
exchange.  This is sufficient, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, to infer the existence of a contractual agreement.   
 
Second, Rothman relies on Bright to argue that there 
was no contractual agreement because there was “no new 
indebtedness”85 as a result of Rothman and Wolfington’s oral 
                                              
82 Appellee Br. at 15; see also id. at 16-17 (“Consummation 
occurs when the plaintiff becomes legally obligated on the 
‘debt.’  Here, the only document legally obligating Plaintiff 
was the written Agreement of January 12, 2016.” (citations 
omitted)); id. at 21. 
83 Id. at 16. 
84 See Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1987).  The Federal Reserve Board’s Official Staff 
Commentary on Regulation Z provides that state law governs 
the consummation of a credit transaction, stating: “State law 
governs. When a contractual obligation on the consumer’s part 
is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law; 
Regulation Z does not make this determination.”  46 Fed. Reg. 
at 50,292. 
85 Appellee Br. at 17; see also id. at 20 (“Plaintiff was not 
extended credit, Plaintiff was provided an alternative to pay a 
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exchange—in other words, that the debt was “preexisting.”86  
This argument is unavailing for the reasons described above—
the Act plainly “contemplates that one who confers a right to 
pay a pre-existing debt in more than four installments will be a 
‘creditor.’”87  Thus, it is irrelevant that the debt was preexisting 
so long as the agreement conferred a right to postpone payment 
of that debt in four or more installments.  As determined above, 
Wolfington has sufficiently pled that he was contractually 
conferred such a right. 
   
Finally, Rothman relies on Bright to argue there was no 
contract formed between the parties because Wolfington failed 
to make payments toward his deductible.88  That argument 
misconstrues the analysis in Bright of the debtors’ payments.  
As described above, the Bright court analyzed the debtors’ 
payments, not because payments were required to form a 
contract, but because it was analyzing whether there was 
evidence that the debtors accepted the terms of repayment 
offered by the hospital.  Despite Rothman’s arguments, Bright 
does not require payments to contractually consummate a 
credit transaction, but merely recognizes that performance may 
be evidence of acceptance under well-established contract 
law.89  
                                              
debt that was due before his surgery . . . .”); id. at 24 
(“Defendant contacted [Wolfington] informally to work out a 
payment arrangement of the existing debt in an informal 
manner.”). 
86 Id. at 20. 
87 Pollice, 225 F.3d at 413. 
88 Appellee Br. at 13-14, 17-18, 21-24. 
89 Rothman’s arguments regarding “no new indebtedness” 




  (c) Writing 
 
Third, the parties dispute whether credit was extended 
to Wolfington in a “written agreement,” as required by 
Regulation Z.  That dispute requires us to resolve two related 
issues:  (1) whether Wolfington’s allegations satisfy 
Regulation Z’s “written agreement” requirement, and (2) 
whether the interpretation of that requirement by the Federal 
Reserve Board staff is entitled to deference from this Court.  
We conclude that Wolfington’s allegations do not satisfy the 
staff interpretation and that interpretation is entitled to 
deference.  Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of judgment on the pleadings.   
 
As relevant here, Regulation Z defines a creditor as a 
“person who regularly extends consumer credit that . . . is 
payable by written agreement in more than four installments 
(not including a down payment).”90  The requirement of a 
formal writing has long been established under the Act and 
Regulation Z.  Prior to the addition of the “written agreement” 
requirement to Regulation Z in 1981,91 the Federal Reserve 
Board’s 1977 staff interpretation instructed that the 
Regulation’s disclosure requirements were not triggered 
without a “formal written workout arrangement [that] 
involve[s] some new evidence of indebtedness executed by the 
                                              
underlying Wolfington’s contractual agreement.  Rothman, 
however, has failed to raise any argument regarding 
consideration on appeal, which it has consequently waived.  
See infra Section II.B.2. 
90 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i). 
91 46 Fed. Reg. at 20,851. 
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customer, such as a new note, contract or other form of written 
agreement.”92   
   
Under that long-standing interpretation, the Board does 
not consider “a unilateral written communication by either the 
creditor or the customer (such as a letter confirming matters 
previously discussed either orally or in writing) [to] render[] a 
workout arrangement formal and subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Regulation Z.”93  A formal agreement is 
distinct from “informal” agreements such as those “by 
telephone.”94  That interpretation was affirmed by the Board 
after amending Regulation Z to expressly require a “written 
agreement,” explaining that a “letter that merely confirms an 
oral agreement does not constitute a written agreement.”95 
 
Based on the requirements of Regulation Z, Rothman 
contends that Wolfington has failed to allege the existence of 
written agreement.96  Wolfington responds that the January 20 
emails either constitute a writing for purposes of Regulation Z 
                                              
92 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425. 
93 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425. 
94 Id. 
95 46 Fed. Reg. at 50,293, as reprinted in 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
supp. I, cmt. 2(a)(17).  The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has reissued the Federal Reserve Board staff 
interpretation verbatim.  12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, supp. I, cmt. 
2(a)(17) (2019), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2019-title12-
vol9/pdf/CFR-2019-title12-vol9-part1026.pdf. 
96 Appellee Br. at 25-28. 
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or are “indicative of a separate written agreement between the 
parties.”97   
 
We conclude that, under the staff’s interpretation of 
Regulation Z, Wolfington failed to sufficiently plead the 
existence of a written credit agreement.  Although Regulation 
Z does not necessarily require the written agreement itself to 
meet all the formalities of a contractual agreement,98 the 
official staff interpretation requires, at the very least, that the 
agreement be “executed by the customer.”99  Wolfington has 
failed to allege that he has executed or signed such an 
agreement.  Instead, he merely alleges that the January 20 
Agreement was negotiated by his father.  Nowhere does he 
allege that he signed a written agreement, and the January 20 
email correspondence was merely “confirming” the 
“previously discussed” agreement.   
 
Further, any written documents in Rothman’s 
possession would not meet the requirements of the staff’s 
official interpretation.  Although it may be reasonable to infer 
that Rothman has some documentation regarding the credit 
transaction, Wolfington fails to allege that he has signed it.  
Under the staff’s official interpretation, those allegations are 
insufficient to establish a “written agreement.” 
 
In supplemental briefing, however, Wolfington 
contends that the staff’s interpretation of Regulation Z’s 
requirement of a “written agreement” is not entitled to 
                                              
97 Appellant Br. at 34. 
98 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i) (defining “creditor” “when 
there is no note or contract”). 
99 42 Fed. Reg. at 40,425. 
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deference from this Court and that we should construe that term 
de novo.  Rothman argues that the staff’s interpretation is 
entitled to deference under the Supreme Court’s decision Auer 
v. Robbins.100 
 
We agree with Rothman with respect to the deference 
owed to the staff interpretation.  In Auer, the Supreme Court 
determined that an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”101  That basic principle has 
been stated in a number of permutations, and in Kisor v. Wilkie, 
the Court took “the opportunity to restate, and somewhat 
expand on, those principles.”102  According to the decision in 
Kisor, Auer deference is “rooted” in “a presumption that 
Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary 
role in resolving regulatory ambiguities.”103  That presumption, 
“though it is always rebuttable,” rests on the inference that 
                                              
100 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  Although deference to an agency’s 
interpretations of its own regulations is often traced to the 
Court’s decision in Auer, the doctrine was first formally 
articulated in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 
410 (1945), and existed in the Court’s jurisprudence even prior 
to Seminole Rock, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 
(2019). 
101 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
102 139 S. Ct. at 2414. 
103 Id. at 2412 (plurality opinion); accord id. at 2416 (majority 
opinion) (“[W]e give Auer deference because we presume, for 
a set of reasons relating to the comparative attributes of courts 
and agencies, that Congress would have wanted us to.”). 
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“when granting rulemaking power to agencies, Congress 
usually intends to give them, too, considerable latitude to 
interpret the ambiguous rules they issue.”104 
That presumption, however, may be rebutted by 
showing that “an interpretation does not reflect an agency’s 
authoritative, expertise-based, ‘fair[, or] considered 
judgment.’”105  Thus, an agency’s interpretation of a regulation 
is entitled to deference under Auer only if five criteria are met:  
(1) the regulation must be “genuinely ambiguous” after the 
court has “exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of 
                                              
104 Id.at 2412 (plurality opinion); accord id. at 2415 (majority 
opinion) (“[W]hen the reasons for that presumption do not 
apply, or countervailing reasons outweigh them, courts should 
not give deference to an agency’s reading . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).  In his supplemental briefing, Wolfington contends 
that Rothman has forfeited any argument that the staff 
interpretation is entitled to deference under Auer.  
Wolfington’s contention, however, is misplaced.  As the Kisor 
Court noted, deference under Auer is a “presumption” 
regarding congressional intent, which may be rebutted as 
described below.  Thus, the burden rests on the party 
challenging the application of Auer.  Neither party addressed 
Auer in its opening brief or before the District Court, and the 
relevant forfeiture here is not Rothman’s, but Wolfington’s 
failure to rebut the presumption of deference.  Nonetheless, 
given our “obligati[on]” to “perform [our] reviewing and 
restraining functions” under Auer, we will consider 
Wolfington’s arguments.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
105 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (alteration in original) (quoting 




construction”106; (2) the interpretation must be “reasonable,” 
falling “within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified 
after employing all its interpretive tools”107; (3) “the character 
and context of the agency interpretation” must entitle it “to 
controlling weight”108 as the agency’s “authoritative” or 
“official position”109 such as “‘official staff memoranda’ that 
were ‘published in the Federal Register’”110; (4) the agency’s 
“interpretation must in some way implicate its substantive 
expertise”111; and, finally, (5) the “agency’s reading of a rule 
must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment,’” that is more than 
a “convenient litigating position” or a “post hoc 
rationalizatio[n].”112 
 
Those five requirements have been met by the staff 
interpretation.  First, the term “written agreement” is 
ambiguous.  On one hand, the plain text of the term suggests 
that the extension of credit must be reduced to a fully integrated 
written instrument.113  On the other hand, we assume that 
                                              
106 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n. 9 (1984)). 
107 Id. at 2415-16. 
108 Id. at 2416 (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155; United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001)). 
109 Id. (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 257-259, 258 n. 6 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
110 Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 
555, 566 n.9, 567 n.10 (1980)). 
111 Id. at 2417. 
112 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 
155). 
113 See Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 
(defining “formal agreement” as “[a]n agreement for which the 
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legislation and regulations are promulgated “against the 
background of the total corpus juris of the states,”114 including 
principles of contract such as the statute of frauds, which 
requires that a “writing” contain only the essential terms of an 
agreement.115  Neither the Act nor Regulation Z defines a 
“written agreement.”  In light of those conflicting principles—
the plain text of the regulation and the background of state 
law—the term “written agreement” is ambiguous. 
                                              
law requires not only the consent of the parties but also a 
manifestation of the agreement in some particular form (e.g., a 
signed writing), in default of which the agreement is 
unenforceable”); Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019) (“A written contract is one which, in all its terms, is in 
writing.”). 
114 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, 
Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Atherton v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)); accord 
O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 
85 (1994) (“Nor would we adopt a court-made rule to 
supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive 
and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are 
presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state 
law.”). 
115 E.g., Trowbridge v. McCaigue, 992 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010); Strausser v. PRAMCO, III, 944 A.2d 761, 
765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (“We agree with appellant that the 
writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds can be satisfied by 
the amalgam of multiple documents[.]”); Haines v. Minnock 
Constr. Co., 433 A.2d 30, 33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The 
Statute of Frauds is satisfied by the existence of a written 
memorandum . . . sufficiently indicating the terms of the oral 




Second, the staff interpretation is reasonable; it resolves 
the ambiguity between the plain text of Regulation Z and state 
law closer to the former, requiring more than a 
“memorandum . . . indicating the terms of the oral agreement,” 
as would be required by the statute of frauds.116 
 
Third, the “character and context” of the staff 
interpretation entitle it to deference.  The 1977 staff 
interpretation requiring a formal writing was published in the 
Federal Register, and the staff reaffirmed its interpretation after 
Regulation Z was amended to require a “written agreement.”  
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reissued that same 
interpretation without alteration.  Thus, the staff interpretation 
constitutes the agencies’ “official position.” 
 
                                              
116 Haines, 433 A.2d at 33.  Wolfington argues that the staff 
interpretation is unreasonable because it would allow a creditor 
“to exempt itself from TILA’s consumer protections through 
the simple expedient of documenting the parties’ credit 
arrangements through confirmatory emails rather than a formal 
written agreement.”  Appellant Letter Br. at 5.  That argument 
is misplaced for two reasons.  First, as discussed at length, the 
Board has required a formal writing since at least 1977, and 
there is no evidence that creditors have systematically sought 
to circumvent the Act’s disclosure requirements by avoiding 
formal written agreements.  Second, the reasonableness 
requirement of Kisor simply requires the agency’s 
interpretation to fall within the regulation’s “zone of 
ambiguity.”  139 S. Ct. at 2416.  The staff interpretation easily 
meets that requirement. 
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Fourth, the staff interpretation implicates the agencies’ 
substantive expertise.  Although Wolfington argues that the 
scope of a “written agreement” is an “interpretive issue[]” that 
“fall[s] more naturally into a judge’s bailiwick,”117 he ignores 
the relationship between the scope of a “written agreement” 
and the implementation of the Act and Regulation Z.  That 
implementation is uniquely within the Board’s province, as the 
scope of the “written agreement” requirement affects the 
efficient enforcement of the Act and the extent of creditors’ 
disclosure duties.  Indeed, the relevance of the agency’s 
substantive expertise is particularly apparent in the fact that 
Congress has provided a defense for any “act done or omitted 
in good faith in conformity with any . . . interpretation” of 
Regulation Z promulgated by the Board118—including its 
interpretation of the “written agreement” requirement.  Under 
that statutory scheme, the interpretation of the Act and 
Regulation Z are well within the Board’s substantive expertise. 
 
Finally, the staff interpretation reflects the agencies’ 
“fair and considered judgment.” 119  The requirement of a 
formal writing has been enforced by two different agencies for 
more than forty years and has been reaffirmed repeatedly both 
in staff interpretations and by the incorporation of the 
requirement in Regulation Z. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the staff interpretation of a 
“written agreement” is entitled to deference from this Court.  
                                              
117 Appellant Letter Br. at 4 (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419).  
118 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f). 




Because Wolfington has not pled such an agreement, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment on the pleadings. 
 
B. Rule 11 Sanctions  
Second, Wolfington’s counsel challenges the District 
Court’s sua sponte imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 in 
the form of attorneys’ fees.  Rule 11 requires that “[e]very 
pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at 
least one attorney of record.”120  “By presenting to the court a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper,” an attorney certifies 
“after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that “the 
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law” and that “the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support.”121   
 
Although the imposition of sanctions previously 
focused on counsel’s subjective good faith, “the test is now an 
objective one of reasonableness.”122  The reasonableness of 
counsel’s conduct depends on a number of factors, including, 
“the amount of time available to . . . conduct[] the factual and 
legal investigation; the necessity for reliance on a client for the 
underlying factual information; the plausibility of the legal 
position advocated” and “the complexity of the legal and 
                                              
120 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). 
121 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). 
122 Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 
F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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factual issues implicated.”123  A court may not sua sponte 
initiate proceedings under Rule 11 after “voluntary dismissal 
or settlement of the claims” at issue.124  The District Court’s 
imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.125 
 
The District Court imposed sanctions on Wolfington’s 
counsel for three reasons:  (1) failing to investigate and obtain 
Wolfington’s bank records; (2) alleging that there was a 
“written agreement” between the parties and an “extension of 
credit”; and, (3) alleging that Wolfington could serve as an 
adequate class representative.126  Below, we analyze each of 
the District Court’s grounds for imposing sanctions as well as 
whether a district court may sua sponte award attorneys’ fees.  
Although Wolfington’s counsel raises a number of arguments 
challenging the imposition of sanctions, we conclude that 
counsel’s conduct did not run afoul of Rule 11 and therefore 
do not reach those other arguments.   
 
 1. Failure to Investigate Bank Records 
 
                                              
123 Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
124 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(B).   
125 Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 289 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
126 JA 59-64.  The District Court states that it initiated Rule 11 
proceedings for a fourth reason, because “[s]everal of the 
allegations in the Complaint were false.”  JA 46.  However, the 
District Court does not discuss any false allegations as an 
independent reason to impose sanctions and appears to have 
integrated that reason with its other three. 
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 The District Court’s first reason for imposing 
sanctions—counsel’s failure to investigate and obtain 
Wolfington’s bank records—rested on the fact “that 
[Wolfington] made no payment to Rothman after his surgery 
on January 21, 2016.”127  According to the District Court, had 
counsel “taken the simple step of obtaining [Wolfington’s] 
bank records . . . it would have been obvious that allegations 
that Rothman was deducting $100.00 a month from 
[Wolfington’s] bank account beginning in February 21, 2016 
were utterly false.”128 
 
 Such payments, however, are irrelevant to a claim under 
the Truth in Lending Act.  “‘The Truth in Lending Act is a 
disclosure law . . . . It is the obligation to disclose, not the duty 
of subsequent performance, towards which the Act is 
directed.’”129  The irrelevance of actual payments by the debtor 
is belied by the Act’s structure.  As noted above, a creditor is 
required to make the Act’s mandated disclosures before the 
credit transaction is consummated—that is, when the borrower 
becomes “contractually obligated on a credit transaction.”130  
The borrower’s contractual obligation to make payments, 
however, does not arise until after the consummation of the 
credit transaction and, consequently, after the creditor is 
required to make the Act’s mandated disclosures.  Thus, a 
                                              
127 JA 60 (reasoning that the bank records would show that 
“Plaintiff made no payments to Rothman”). 
128 JA 61. 
129 Davis v. Werne, 673 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1982) (omission 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Burgess v. Charlottesville Savings & Loan Ass’n, 477 F.2d 40, 
44-45 (4th Cir. 1973)). 
130 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13). 
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creditor’s obligations under the Act precede a debtor’s 
obligations under contract both temporally and logically.   
 
 In this case, Wolfington’s alleged payments were 
relevant only to his withdrawn claim under the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act.131  That claim, however, could not serve 
as a basis for sua sponte sanctions under Rule 11, because it 
was withdrawn.  Rule 11 provides, “The court must not impose 
a monetary sanction . . . on its own, unless it issued the show-
cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) before voluntary dismissal” of 
the claims at issue,132 a provision that was added by 
amendments to the Rule in 1993.133  Because that claim was 
withdrawn before the District Court ordered counsel to show 
cause, it consequently could not serve as grounds for the 
imposition of sanctions. 
 
 Despite the express language of Rule 11, the District 
Court stated that it did “not credit counsel’s contention that [it] 
could not impose sanctions for the voluntarily dismissed EFTA 
claim.”134  The District Court cited two pre-amendment cases, 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.135 and Schering Corp. v. 
Vitarine Pharm., Inc.136 for the proposition that it may impose 
sanctions on withdrawn claims.  Neither of those decisions, 
                                              
131 JA 95.  The factually incorrect allegations regarding 
Wolfington’s payments appeared in the Complaint only under 
the heading “EFTA.”  JA 94. 
132 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(B).   
133 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 
amendment. 
134 JA 57 n.12. 
135 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990). 
136 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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however, involved sanctions imposed sua sponte,137 and to the 
extent they permit a court to sua sponte impose sanctions on 
claims that were withdrawn before any show cause order was 
issued, they were superseded by the 1993 amendments to Rule 
11.  Those amendments expressly provide that “a monetary 
sanction imposed after a court-initiated show cause order . . . 
be imposed only if the show cause order is issued before any 
voluntary dismissal.”138  Consequently, the District Court was 
incorrect that it could impose sanctions for Wolfington’s 
withdrawn claim if it so determined. 
 
  2. Allegations of Extension of Credit and a 
Written Agreement 
  
 The District Court’s second reason for imposing 
sanctions, because there was no “extension of credit” and no 
“written agreement,” was also in error.  In imposing sanctions, 
the District Court concluded that counsel unreasonably alleged 
the “extension of credit” because Wolfington failed to make 
payments to Rothman.139  The District Court reasoned that 
without any payments, there was no consideration, and 
consequently, no extension of credit.140  This is incorrect; 
under Pennsylvania law, the exchange of bargained-for 
                                              
137 496 U.S. at 389; 889 F.2d at 494. 
138 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 
amendment. 
139 JA 62. 
140 Id.  Although the contractual obligations of the parties are 
most relevant to consummation of the credit transaction, we 
follow the District Court’s analysis of consideration under the 
label of “extension of credit,” without adopting or endorsing it.  
See supra note 106. 
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promises constitutes valid consideration.141  Thus, the District 
Court erred in concluding that there was no extension of credit 
because Wolfington failed to make payments; instead, the 
extension of credit was valid upon the exchange of promises.   
 
Further, the District Court erred in concluding that 
counsel unreasonably alleged the existence of a “written 
agreement.”  The reasonableness of the allegations in a 
complaint and counsel’s underlying investigation depend, in 
part, on the “the complexity of the legal and factual issues 
implicated.”142  The Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of 
the “written agreement” requirement now in Regulation Z 
dates from 1977 and is buried in the annals of the Federal 
Register.  Although those interpretations are entitled to 
deference, counsel’s failure to find them was not unreasonable.  
Instead, counsel raised a reasonable argument, interpreting the 
text of Regulation Z to require only a “writing . . . to confirm 
what the oral agreement was,” an interpretation the District 
Court acknowledged was plausible.143  Thus, counsel’s 
reliance on the January 20 email as a “written agreement” was 
not unreasonable, despite ultimately being incorrect. 
 
3. Class Allegations 
 
The District Court’s third ground for imposing 
sanctions—counsel’s class-related allegations—also rested on 
counsel’s failure to obtain Wolfington’s bank records.  The 
District Court stated, “If the bank records had been secured, it 
would have been obvious that there was no basis whatsoever 
                                              
141 See Greene, 526 A.2d at 1195.   
142 Mary Ann Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 95. 
143 JA 202-03. 
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to allege Plaintiff could represent a class,” presumably because 
he failed to make payments to Rothman.144  This ground fails 
for the same reasons as the first:  Wolfington’s failure to make 
payments to Rothman is irrelevant to his Truth-in-Lending 
claim. 
 
 4. Sua Sponte Award of Attorneys’ Fees 
 
Finally, the District Court erred in imposing sanctions 
in the form of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11 sua 
sponte.  Rule 11 does not permit a district court to award 
attorneys’ fees in proceedings initiated under the Rule sua 
sponte.  Rule 11(c)(4) defines the sanctions available to the 
sanctioning court.  It provides, “The sanction may include 
nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; 
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or 
all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly 
resulting from the violation.”145  Unlike for the imposition of 
“nonmonetary” sanctions and “penalt[ies]” paid to the court, 
Rule 11(c)(4) allows an award of attorneys’ fees only “if 
imposed on motion.”  That provision was added to Rule 11 as 
subsection (c)(2) by the Rule’s 1993 amendments; the 
Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1993 amendments confirm 
this reading of the Rule.146  The 1993 notes provide, “The 
power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but 
with the condition that this be done through a show cause 
order. . . . The revision provides that a monetary sanction 
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imposed after a court-initiated show cause order be limited to 
a penalty payable to the court.”147  Thus, a court may not 
require payment of attorneys’ fees in Rule 11 proceedings 
initiated sua sponte.148 
 
For the above reasons, the District Court abused its 
discretion in imposing sanctions.  Because the imposition of 
sanctions is necessarily fact-intensive and only Rule 11 was 
briefed by the parties in the District Court or addressed by the 
District Court, we decline to consider in the first instance 
whether sanctions could have been imposed on other grounds.   
 
C. Leave to Amend  
 
Finally, we consider Wolfington’s belated request for 
leave to amend his Complaint.  Motions to amend under Rule 
15 are typically granted liberally, and a court may deny leave 
to amend only when “(1) the moving party has demonstrated 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment 
would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the 
other party.”149  However, “[w]hen a party seeks leave to 
amend a complaint after judgment has been entered, it must 
also move to set aside the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b), because the complaint 
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148 Accord Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 
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cannot be amended while the judgment stands.”150  “Where a 
timely motion to amend judgment is filed under Rule 59(e), the 
Rule 15 and 59 inquiries turn on the same factors.”151  
Nonetheless, “in non-civil rights cases, district courts have no 
obligation to offer leave to amend before dismissing a 
complaint unless the plaintiff properly requests it.”152 
 
Wolfington requests leave to amend in a footnote in a 
supplemental letter brief filed with this Court.  However, on 
appeal, Wolfington fails to address whether he meets the 
standards for leave to amend under Rule 15(a).  He likewise 
failed to move to amend his Complaint in the District Court.  
Consequently, we decline to consider those issues. 
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1984) (concluding that Rule 15(a) standard governs motion to 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
 
